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Jackson v. Commonwealth
499 S.E.2d 538 (Va. 1998)
I. Facts
On August 31, 1994, Chauncey Jacob Jackson ("Jackson") rode in a Jeep
Cherokee driven by one of his friends. His friend stopped the vehicle to talk
with three other friends standing on a street. One of the three friends suggested
that the group rob a man, Ronald Gene Bonney, Jr. ("Bonney"), who was seated
in a car parked close by. Jackson took a gun from the Jeep and, accompanied by
two others from the group, walked over to Bonney's car. One of the men
accompanyingJackson blocked Bonney's door with his leg so that Bonney could
not escape from his vehicle. Jackson, armed with the gun, entered Bonney's car
on the passenger side and demanded that Bonney give him money. Bonney
indicated that he had no money, and then purportedly said "Shoot me, you little
f--ker," to Jackson. Jackson cocked the gun, it jammed, and then the gun fired
three times, hitting Bonney in the arm and the chest and causing his death.
Jackson fled in the Jeep and was arrested later that night.'
Jackson was found guilty by a jury on charges which included capital
murder. At the penalty phase, the Commonwealth introduced evidence ofJack-
son's criminal record to establish that Jackson would be a danger in the future.2
Jackson's juvenile criminal record included findings that Jackson was not inno-
cent of other offenses, which included receiving stolen property, possession of
cocaine, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle inspection sticker, driving without
a license, altered license plates, and speeding.' Jackson was incarcerated for
thirteen months awaiting trial on the capital murder charges, but was released on
bond on October 24, 1995. Evidence was also introduced at the penalty phase
1. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 499 S.E.2d 538, 543 (Va. 1998).
2. For a defendant to be sentenced to death in Virginia, it is statutorily required that:
[The Commonwealth shall prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a probability
based upon evidence of the prior history of the defendant or of the circumstances
surrounding the commission of the offense... that he would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society ....
VA. CODEANN. § 19.2-264.4(C) (Michie 1998). This requirement is known commonly as proof of
"future dangerousness."
3. Defense counsel should be aware that motions in limine can be filed to keep certain types
of evidence from being introduced or even referred to at the penalty phase and at other phases of
the trial process. Specifically, a motion in limine could have been made to keep out all of the
offenses on Jackson's record that had no bearing on his future dangerousness. Acts such as driving
without a license, possession of altered license plates, the unauthorized use of an inspection sticker,
and the possession of cocaine could all be said to have little bearing on determining whetherJackson
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society.
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that in December of 1995, while free on bond, Jackson was involved in the
unlawful entry of a house and that he was convicted of 14 felony charges arising
therefrom. Additionally, an inmate testified that when Jackson was imprisoned
for the December 1995 incident, Jackson assaulted the inmate. Jackson was
never tried on this accusation! Jackson was sentenced to death on the basis of
"future dangerousness" under section 19.2-264.4 of the Virginia Code.' Jackson
appealed his conviction of capital murder. The Supreme Court of Virginia




The Supreme Court of Virginia denied all ofJackson's assignments of error
stemming from his capital murder conviction, finding that the claims were with-
out merit. Further, the court found that the sentence of death was not inappro-
priately imposed upon Jackson.
7
III. Anaysis/Application in Virginia
A. Previously Decided Issues
Jackson raised several issues that had been rejected by the Supreme Court
of Virginia in past cases. Finding thatJackson presented nothing to persuade the
4. Use of alleged unadjudicated acts of misconduct is quite common in Virginia capital
cases, especially where Commonwealth evidence may otherwise be weak. Use of fellow inmates to
give statements against the defendant is also common. There are several ways to combat or
discourage these practices.
First, defense counsel should require the state to give specific and timely notice of any
unadjudicated act evidence it intends to use at trial. Under section 19.2-264.3:2 of the Virginia Code
("3:2"), upon motion by the defendant, if the attorney for the Commonwealth intends to introduce
evidence of unadjudicated acts of criminal conduct during the sentencing phase, then the attorney
for the Commonwealth must give notice in writing of such intent and describe the alleged conduct
and the time and place where it is alleged to have occurred. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:2
(Michie 1998). A 3:2 motion allows defense counsel to do background work to discredit the
existence of the alleged act and to research any witnesses who may testify to the alleged acts.
Second, defense counsel should fully explore and demand information under Kyles v. Whitley,
514 U.S. 419 (1995), and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). These two cases require that the state
disclose evidence casting doubt on the certainty and reliability of witness testimony, prior statements
of the state's key witnesses, and evidence showing that the state's investigation was less than thor-
ough. With regard to the use of statements by fellow inmates, defense counsel should make
Kyles/Brady motions to discover the celmate statements, other witnesses who may have heard the
same purported statement made to the cellmate, jail records which may show that the cellmate was
regularly placed near defendants to get statements for state use, any conversations with the Common-
wealth that the inmate may have had, and any promises made to the cellmates by the state. All of
these pieces of evidence may lead to the casting of doubt on the reliability of any cellmate witnesses.
In all cases it is important to treat unadjudicated misconduct as a separate criminal charge to
be defended as such - a "trial within a trial" with its own discovery and motions as seen above.
5. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (Michie 1998).
6. Jackson, 499 S.E.2d at 543-544.
7. Id. at 555.
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court to decide the issues differently than it had in the past cases, the court
rejected the claims.' It is important that defense counsel at least raised these
issues, even though the Supreme Court of Virginia had already squarely ruled
against them. By doing so, these issues were preserved for federal habeas or
certiorari review. In particular, three of the issues rejected by the court in this
manner seem to be particularly good candidates for federal review. These issues
were: (1) that imposition of the death penalty based on future dangerousness was
unconstitutional when partly based on prior unadjudicated acts committed by the
defendant, without any requirement of a standard of proof for such acts; (2) that
the future dangerousness factor and the instructions, in conformity with the
statutory language, which were given by the court, are unconstitutional because
they are vague; and (3) that the court's method of reviewing the proportionality
of the imposition of the death sentence, by considering only those murder cases
in which death was imposed and not cases where a lesser sentence was imposed,
is invalid. Although all of these claims were rejected, they are all issues which
may one day be heard by the Supreme Court of the United States.' Thus, it is
important that defense counsel at least raised these claims, even in the face of
certain rejection, because by raising the issues they were preserved for further
review at other levels.10
8. Id. at 544-45.
9. An example of a "hopeless" claim that eventually brought relief is the issue of whether
due process requires that juries be informed that a life sentence without parole is the only alternative
to a death sentence in states where parole is prohibited in cases of future dangerousness. See
Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994). Another example of a "hopeless" claim that
eventually brought relief is the issue of whether evidence that a defendant has adjusted well to
incarceration between arrest and trial is mitigating evidence that cannot be excluded at trial. See
Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
10. The court rejected some claims in cursory fashion. Some turned on facts particular to
this case. Others provided little or no guidance for counsel in the future. These claims will not be
discussed at length in this summary. They include Jackson's contention that his Fifth Amendment
rights were violated by the admission of certain statements he made to the police into evidence at
trial, in part because he was not allowed to see his mother, who was at the police station, during the
four hour interrogation process. The court rejected this claim, however, it did imply that if a
situation were factually sufficient, a juvenile defendant's interrogation without the presence of one
of his parents may be constitutionally impermissible. Jackson also contended that the entire venire
should have been struck because they had heard certain courtroom sentencing discussions. Jackson
further claimed that the prosecution had improperly used peremptory strikes under Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that use of peremptory strikes may not be purposefully based
on racial grounds; party whose use of peremptory strikes is questioned as being based on race must
give a race-neutral explanation for the strike). Jackson also contended that he should have been
granted a strike for cause on a juror who was illiterate. The court rejected this claim since all written
evidentiary materials had been read to the illiterate juror by other jurors. This situation is potentially
problematic if the reading juror incorrectly reads some of the materials to the illiterate juror, or if
the reading juror seeks to influence the illiterate juror and purposefully misreads the evidence to the
illiterate juror. Thus, this issue is one which may prompt further judicial inquiry and preservation
of this issue for further appellate inquiry was important. Other holdings included: (1) the trial court
has discretion to allow the Commonwealth to reopen its case after it has rested, and (2) only slight
corroboration of an accused's statements is required to establish the corpus delicti when the accused
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B. Su'ecting Sixteen Year Old Defendants to the Death Penalty
Jackson, who was sixteen at the time of the murders," claimed that Virginia
statutes did not specifically provide for the imposition of the death penalty on
juveniles convicted of murder, thus the death penalty could not be imposed upon
him. 2 According to Jackson, under Stanford v. Kentucky, 3 each state has to use
great specificity in death penalty statutes articulating a policy permitting imposi-
tion of the death penalty on juveniles, for the imposition of the death penalty to
be constitutionally sound.
Stanford, and its companion case, Wilkins v. Missouri,4 dealt with two juve-
niles, ages sixteen and seventeen, who had been sentenced to death for separate
crimes under the laws of Kentucky and Missouri, respectively. The Supreme
Court of the United States ruled that the execution of sixteen and seventeen year-
olds was not, in and of itself, unconstitutional. However, the Court acknowl-
edged that under Lockett v. Ohio, s each defendant is entitled to an individual
consideration of his eligibility for the death penalty. 6 Accordingly, the court
ruled that for a juvenile to be constitutionally eligible for the death penalty, the
transfer proceedings which allowed him to be tried as an adult, rather than as a
juvenile, must provide for an individualized determination that the juvenile
possessed the requisite moral responsibility and maturity to be sentenced as an
adult. 7 The court further ruled that the determination of requisite moral respon-
sibility and maturity should be made initially by the juvenile courts, prior to
transferring the juvenile to stand trial as an adult. 8
In Stanfordand Wilkins, the Court found that the respective juvenile transfer
procedures employed by Kentucky 9 and Missouri ° did provide for an individual-
fully confesses that he committed the crime.
11. Jackson, 499 S.E.2d at 542.
12. Id at 552.
13. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
14. Id
15. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
16. Lockett V. Ohio, 438 U.S. at 605.
17. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 374-75 (1989).
18. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 375.
19. The Kentucky statute provided, at the time, that
If the court determines that probable cause exists [to believe that a person 16 years old
or older committed a felony or that a person under 16 years of age committed a Class
A felony or a capital offense], it shall then determine if it is in the best interest of the
child and the community to order such a transfer based upon the seriousness of the
alleged offense; whether the offense was against person or property, with greater
weight being given to offenses against persons; the maturity of the child as determined
by his environment; the child's prior record; and the prospects for adequate protection
of the public and the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the child by the use of
procedures, services, and facilities currently available to the juvenile justice system.
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. S 208.170(3) (Michie 1982) (repealed effective July 15, 1984).
20. The Missouri statute provided, at the time, that in determining whether a juvenile should
[Vol. 11: 1
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ized determination of whether juvenile defendants possessed the moral responsi-
bility and maturity to be tried as adults.21
Accordingly, in Jackson, the Supreme Court of Virginia looked to Virginia's
transfer proceedings and found that the Virginia transfer statute addressed the
"prosecution and punishment of juveniles in as much detail as the similar Ken-
tucky and Missouri statutes which are acknowledged in Stanford as sufficient to
authorize those states to impose the death penalty upon juveniles 16 or 17 years
of age."'  At the time, the Virginia juvenile transfer statute bore some resem-
blance to the Kentucky and Missouri statutes, perhaps enough to be approved
under Stanford. However, the juvenile transfer statute in effect today falls far
short of providing for a determination of whether juvenile defendants possess
the moral responsibility and maturity to be tried as adults.
The present Virginia juvenile transfer provision is found at section 16.1-
269.1 of the Virginia Code.' Under section A of this statute, a list of factors
("section A factors"), very similar to those listed by the Kentucky and Missouri
statutes, are to be considered by the juvenile court in determining whether to
transfer jurisdiction from the juvenile to the circuit court.24 However, under
section B of this statute, if a juvenile fourteen years of age or older is charged
with capital murder, the juvenile court holds a preliminary hearing.' If the court
finds probable cause at the preliminary hearing, then the juvenile court certifies
the charge to a grand jury, thereby divesting itself of jurisdiction over the juvenile
without considering any of the section A factors.26 Thus, if the juvenile is
be transferred from the juvenile court to a circuit court, the juvenile court must consider.
(1) The seriousness of the offense alleged and whether the protection of the commu-
nity requires transfer to the court of general jurisdiction;
(2) Whether the offense alleged involved viciousness, force, and violence;
(3) Whether the offense alleged was against person or property, with greater weight
being given to the offense against persons, especially if personal injury resulted;
(4) Whether the offense alleged is a part of a repetitive pattern of offenses which
indicates that the child may be beyond rehabilitation under the juvenile code;
(5) The record and history of the child, including experience with the juvenile justice
system, other courts, supervision, commitments to juvenile institutions and other
placements;
(6) The sophistication and maturity of the child as determined by consideration of his
home and environmental situation, emotional condition and pattern of living;
(7) The program and facilities available to the juvenile court in considering disposition;
and
(8) Whether or not the child can benefit from the treatment or rehabilitative programs
available to the juvenile court.
Mo REv. STAT. § 211.071(6) (1986).
21. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 375.
22. Jackson, 499 S.E.2d at 552.
23. VA. CODE ANN. 16.1-269.1 (Michie 1998).
24. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.1(A)(4) (Michie 1998).
25. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.1(B) (Michie 1998).
26. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.1(D) (Michie 1998).
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charged with capital murder there need not be any consideration of the factors
found in section A, only a consideration of probable cause. One Virginia Court
of Appeals case, Dara v. Commonwealth,V has construed the statute that way,
holding that if a section B hearing is required (in other words, if capital murder
or first degree murder is the charge), the court need not consider the section A
factors. If this is so, then the Virginia juvenile transfer statute is in no significant
way similar to the Kentucky and Missouri statutes upheld in Stanford. The
Virginia statutes provide for no consideration of the juvenile's moral responsibil-
ity and maturity to be tried as an adult before the juvenile can be transferred to
the circuit courts. Under Stanford, this statutory scheme is unacceptable.
This issue should definitely be litigated. The Virginia statutory scheme fails
to meet the constitutional standard required by Stanford. This issue should be
raised before the transfer proceeding is ever initiated, after it is initiated, and at
every possible stage to assure its preservation for federal appeal. As seen by this
decision and the Dara case, it is unlikely that any Virginia court will hold the
juvenile transfer statutory scheme to be insufficient under Stanford. Thus, it
becomes important to preserve this issue for federal appeal.
C. Speedy Trial Violations and Their Causes
Jackson contended that his constitutionalP and statutory 9 rights to a speedy
trial had been violated. The court conceded that the length of the delay in
bringingJackson to trial was both statutorily and constitutionally unacceptable."
However, the court found that the time delays were caused by continuances
requested or acquiesced in by Jackson." Thus, under Barkerv. Wingo,32 the court
ruled that under these circumstances Jackson waived his rights to a speedy trial.33
The court may have misread Barker. Demand for trial is but one of four
factors to be balanced in evaluating claims of speedy trial denial, as is illustrated
27. No. 2795-95-1, 1997 WL 52421 (Va. App. Feb. 11, 1997).
28. Under the case of Barker'. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), there are four criteria which must
be considered in determining whether the United States Constitution's Sixth Amendment right to
a speedy trial has been violated. The criteria are "[length of delay, the reason for the delay, the
defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant." Id at 530 (footnote omitted).
29. In Virginia, the statutory time frame in which a trial must begin is codified at section 19.2-
243 of the Virginia Code. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-243 (Michie 1998). The time frame required is
either five or nine months depending upon the procedural circumstances of the case. The time
period may be extended if the failure to bring the defendant to trial within the requisite time period
was caused by, among other causes, continuances granted on the motion of the accused or his
counsel, or by concurrence in a motion for continuance made by the prosecution.
30. Jackson, 499 S.E.2d at 549-50.
31. Id at 550.
32. 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (holding that in determining whether there has been a violation of
the constitutional right to a speedy trial, the court should balance several factors, including length
of and reason for delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and the prejudice to the defendant
caused by the delay).
33. Jackson, 499 S.E.2d at 550.
[Vol. 11: 1
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by a more recent case. According to Doggett v. United States,' when determining
the reason for the delay under Barker, the inquiry to be made is "whether the
government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for that delay."3 Thus,
if there are other reasons, the court should have determined who was more
responsible for the delay.
In Jackson's case it is arguable that there were other government-caused
reasons for the delay. Jackson was first indicted for the murder of Bonney in
October of 1994.36 However, these indictments were thrown out because the
circuit court failed to conduct the review of Jackson's transfer from the juvenile
courts required by section 16.1-269.6 of the Virginia Code37 before the indict-
ments were issued. After the review was conducted in June of 1995, new indict-
ments were issued in December of 1995. The trial began on August 21, 1996.
The period of time between Jackson's first indictment and his trial was almost
two years. It is arguable then, that one of the reasons Jackson was not brought
to trial sooner was the state's negligence in failing to conduct the proper review
procedures. Under Doggett, negligence of the state is an "unacceptable reason for
delaying a criminal prosecution once it has begun." 8 Thus, Jackson could have
argued that under Doggett, there was more than one reason for the delay, there-
fore, it should have been determined whether the state or the defendant was
more to blame for the delay.
Although it is rare for a defendant to prevail on a denial of speedy trial
claim, it is worth noting, on a practical note, that responsibility for many continu-
ances can properly be placed upon the Commonwealth. There is no reason, for
example, to permit the record to cast any responsibility on defense counsel for
delays occasioned by the Commonwealth's failure to provide timely disclosure
of that which it is required by law to disclose, or by failure to respond in a
prompt and relevant manner to pretrial motions.
D. Defense Counsel Use of Experts
Jackson made several claims based upon a mental examination conducted
upon him by Dr. Nelson, the Commonwealth's expert appointed pursuant to
section 19.2-264.3:1(F) of the Virginia Code ("3:1")." However, the court
34. 505 U.S. 647 (1992).
35. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992).
36. Jackson, 499 S.E.2d at 542.
37. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.6 (Michie 1998).
38. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 657.
39. This statute provides:
If the attorney for the defendant gives notice pursuant to subsection E and the
Commonwealth thereafter seeks an evaluation concerning the existence or absence of
mitigating circumstances relating to the defendant's mental condition at the time of the
offense, the court shall appoint one or more qualified experts to perform such an
evaluation.
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1 (F) (Michie 1998).
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rejected all of Jackson's claims because Jackson called Dr. Nelson to testify on
Jackson's behalf at the penalty phase of his trial.4" Were it not for this odd
situation where the defense calls the state's expert to testify, several of Jackson's
claims would appear to have merit and are worth mentioning.
If the Commonwealth seeks an examination of the defendant under 3:1,
section F of the statute requires that the court order the defendant to submit to
the examination, and "advise the defendant on the record in court that a refusal to
cooperate with the Commonwealth's expert could result in exclusion of the
defendant's expert evidence."'" In Jackson's case, the court failed to give the
warning required by section F. Defense counsel should pay careful attention to
whether the court follows this procedure, and if it is not followed, assert it as a
bar to testimony of the Commonwealth expert.
Second,Jackson contended that the evaluation sought by the state pursuant
to section F should not have been ordered. Jackson contended that the statute
forced him to choose between his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimina-
tion and his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial because the statute required
him to cooperate with a court-appointed psychiatrist or suffer the possibility that
his experi evidence would be barred.42 The court cited past cases where it had
rejected the same contention and accordingly ruled againstJackson.43 However,
Jackson's point is potentially a good one and should continue to be litigated.'
A related issue, not raised by Jackson, is the Fifth Amendment right to a
warning before the evaluation. According to Estelle v. Smith," a defendant's Fifth
Amendment right not to incriminate himself applies to state mental examinations
conducted at the penalty phase.4 6 Accordingly,Jackson argued that the defendant
in such situations should be warned that if he or she gives up his right to remain
silent, and cooperates with the state's examination, his statements may be used
against him at the penalty phase and his Fifth Amendment right may be waived.
This warning is not given to defendants in Virginia, and under Savino v. Murray,47
appears to not be required by the United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
However, the Supreme Court of the United States has yet to rule upon this issue,
40. Defense counsel's decision to call the Commonwealth expert to testify is a curious one.
There are high risk factors associated with calling an expert who performed an examination for the
State. By calling the expert to testify, the defense counsel opened the door for the state to present
expert testimony in rebuttal to the issues raised by the expert called by the defense. See VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1(G) (Michie 1998). On the other hand, the expert apparently gave some
testimony favorable to Jackson.
41. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-261.3:1(F) (Michie 1998) (emphasis added).
42. Jackson, 499 S.E.2d at 553.
43. Id
44. For a discussion of the issue raised by Jackson, and possibilities for court recognizance
of the problem asserted, see Elizabeth A. Bennett, Is Preclusion Under Va. Code. Ann. 19.2-264.3:1
Unconstituional?, CAP. DEF. DIG., vol. 2, no.1, p.2 4 (1989).
45. 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
46. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1981).
47. 82 F.3d 593 (4th Cir. 1996).
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and given the ruling in Estelle, the Court may rule that Miranda rights are not
waived simply by availing oneself of a statutory right to an expert on capital
sentence mitigation, as compared to an affirmative defense such as insanity.
48
Therefore the claim should be raised by defense counsel and preserved in the
record at all levels so that the possibility of Supreme Court review is left open.
Finally, Jackson claimed that the court erroneously allowed'Dr. Nelson to
offer an opinion onJackson's future dangerousness, which, according toJackson,
was an opinion on the ultimate issue for the jury.49 The court held, and Jackson
conceded, that Nelson did not actually say thatJackson would be a danger in the
future."0 However, the court ruled that even if Nelson had said that Jackson
would be a danger in the future, such testimony would not have constituted an
opinion as to the ultimate issue.5 ' According to the court, the ultimate issue was
whether Jackson should be sentenced to death or imprisoned for life, not
whether he would be a future danger or not.52
The court erred by deciding that future dangerousness is not an ultimate
issue in a capital case. For a death sentence to be imposed, future dangerousness
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 3 This requirement is similar to the
state being required to prove intent in a larceny case, which also must be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. Both are ultimate issues on which witnesses should
not be allowed to offer an opinion.' In any event, the court's treatment of this
issue is but one more reason to consider making full use of 3:1 experts short of
calling them to the stand.5
E. Dysfunctional Proporionaliy Review
Under section 17.1-313 of the Virginia Code, 6 the court had to determine
whether the death sentence imposed upon Jackson was excessive or dispropor-
tionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and
the defendant. The court ruled that juries in the Commonwealth generally
48. Invocation of an insanity defense to the crime itself does operate as a waiver. See
Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402 (1987).
49. Jackson, 499 S.E.2d at 553.
50. Id at 553.
51. Id
52. Id at 553-54.
53. For a defendant to be sentenced to death in Virginia, it is statutorily required that: "the
Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a probability based upon
evidence of the prior history of the defendant.., that he would commit criminal acts of violence
that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society..." VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4
(Michie 1998).
54. Bond v. Commonwealth, 311 S.E.2d 769 (Va. 1984).
55. For a more thorough discussion of using, but not calling an expert witness to testify, see
Douglas S. Collica, Aice in Wonderland Interpretations: Rethinking the Use of Mental Mitigation Experts,
CAP. DEF. J., vol. 9, no. 1, p. 57 (1996).
56. VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-313 (Michie 1998).
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impose the death sentence for crimes comparable to Jackson's murder of
Bonney."' The court stated that it gave "particular consideration to other capital
murder cases in which robbery or attempted robbery was the underlying felony
and the death penalty was based only on future dangerousness."" This state-
ment evidences that the court considered only the crime in its penalty compari-
son. The court should have more carefully considered those capital murder cases
based on robbery and future dangerousness which were committed by sixteen-
year-olds. By looking at such cases with sixteen-year-old defendants, the court
would have considered both the crime and the defendant as required by section
17.1-313 of the Virginia Code.
59
Justice Hassell dissented from the majority of the court on the grounds that
the court failed to consider the defendant in its proportionality review. Accord-
ing to Hassell, juries in Virginia generally have not approved of the imposition
of the death penalty for 16-year-old capital murder offenders.' ° Hassell looked
at ten capital murder cases in which a 16-year-old was the defendant. In those
ten cases, only Jackson was sentenced to death.6'
Proportionality review in Virginia is perfunctory and meaningless. For that
very reason, it must be challenged on federal constitutional grounds, even though
proportionality review is a state statutory obligation. There are at least two ways
to "federalize" a challenge of proportionality review conducted by the Supreme
Court of Virginia. First, under Pulley v. Harris,6t proportionality review of a death
sentence, if required by statute, must at least be meaningfully done to be constitu-
tional under the Eighth Amendment. Defense counsel should allege that by
failing to examine the proportionality with regards to the crime and the defen-
dant, as required by statute, the court is not meaningfully reviewing the propor-
tionality of the death sentence. Second, it is arguable that it is a violation of the
Due Process Clause to conduct the review, which is a right granted by statute, in
an arbitrary manner. Arguably, the court's failure to examine similar crimes com-
mitted by 16-year-olds is arbitrary. In the case of Dubois v. Greene,63 the United
States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit implicitly recognized this state created
right argument as a legitimate way to federalize an issue.
Jason J. Solomon
57. Jackson, 499 S.E.2d at 554-55.
58. Id at 554.
59. VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-313 (Michie 1998).
60. Jackson, 499 S.E.2d at 555.
61. Id at 555.
62. 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
63. No. 97-21, 1998 WL 276282 (4th. Cir. May 26,1998). See Case Note of Dubois v. Greene,
11 CAP. DEF.J. 87 (1998).
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